Capital structure dynamics in private business groups by Dewaelheyns, Nico & Van Hulle, Cynthia
Capital Structure Dynamics in Private Business Groups 
 
 
 
Nico Dewaelheyns 
Lessius University College, Department of Business Studies, Korte Nieuwstraat 33, 2000 Antwerp, Belgium 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Accountancy, Finance and Insurance, 
Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium; email: nico.dewaelheyns@econ.kuleuven.be 
 
Cynthia Van Hulle 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Accountancy, Finance and Insurance, 
Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium; email: cynthia.vanhulle@econ.kuleuven.be 
 
 
April 2009 
 
 
Abstract  
 
Dynamic models of capital structure assume that companies trade-off the advantages of a 
leverage adjustment to its costs. Private companies are expected to have more restricted 
access to capital markets and are therefore likely to adjust their capital structure less 
frequently than public ones. However, private companies that are part of a business group 
have access to both internal and external capital markets and may face lower adjustment 
costs. We find significant differences in the leverage levels and dynamics of large, non-
financial affiliates of private Belgian business groups and comparable stand-alone 
companies. Our results indicate that group affiliates take advantage of their better access to 
financing to more frequently adjust both their total leverage and external leverage ratios. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Even after decades of active theoretical and empirical research, the question of what 
determines a company’s capital structure remains a key research area in corporate finance. In 
recent years, the focus of capital structure research has increasingly shifted from examining 
the determinants of leverage levels to studying the drivers of adjustments in capital structure, 
i.e. capital structure dynamics. One of the main insights of this literature is that companies 
trade-off the potential benefits of adjusting their capital structure (e.g. tax optimization, 
reducing financing costs or ameliorating agency problems) against the transaction costs of 
doing so. The vast majority of the available empirical evidence on this issue concerns stock 
exchanged quoted companies, who appear to frequently adjust their leverage (e.g. Flannery 
and Rangan, 2006 and Leary and Roberts, 2005 for the U.S.; Ozkan, 2001 for the U.K.; de 
Miguel and Pindado, 2001 for Spain). Private companies, however, are expected to have a 
much more restricted access to capital markets. In other words, they face higher transaction 
costs, which will lead them to adjust their capital structure less frequently (Brav, 2004). This 
lack of financing flexibility is often regarded as a major disadvantage of private companies as 
compared to public ones (Huyghebaert and Van Hulle, 2006).  
 
However, using insights from another fast growing field of research – the literature on 
business groups and internal capital markets – we argue that not all types of private 
companies will face adjustment costs to the same extent. Companies that are part of a 
business group are expected to have better access to capital markets (both internal and 
external) than comparable stand-alone companies (Schiantarelli and Sembenelli, 2000). If this 
is the case, business group member companies should be able to adjust their capital structure 
more frequently. Given the importance of the business group organizational form in many 
regions of the world – including Continental Europe, South East Asia and emerging markets 
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regions as e.g. India – this could be relevant for a large number of companies. For instance, 
more than 20% of the top 50,000 (in terms of revenue) non-financial companies in the euro-
zone are linked to a private domestic business group.1 
 
 This paper empirically examines the capital structure adjustment process of large2, 
non-financial members of Belgian3 private business groups and comparable stand-alone 
companies. The sample selection is made to ensure the cleanest possible test of the group 
versus stand-alone effect. First of all, we only include private stand-alone companies and 
subsidiaries of business groups without a stock-exchange listed component. This implies that 
neither type of companies will have access to public capital markets (cf. Dewaelheyns and 
Van Hulle, 2009). Second, we only include domestic business group subsidiaries, so that all 
companies we consider operate within the same institutional framework and are subject to the 
same tax regime, thus bypassing potential confounding effects from international tax 
optimization of capital structure as described in Desai et al. (2004). Finally, we limit the 
analysis to larger companies because only companies filing complete financial statements 
provide sufficient details on internal debt financing. The focus on large companies has the 
additional advantage that a number of SME related problems w.r.t. capital structure decisions 
– for instance the fact that some owners or managers of SMEs might lack the economic 
expertise to make well-founded capital structure decisions (Van Auken, 2005) – are avoided.  
                                                 
1 20.6% of the top 50,000 (in terms of sales of 2006) non-financial companies in the euro-zone are non-listed 
and have ties to a private business group (excluding government owned groups) using a strict 50.01% control 
criterion (Source: Amadeus database, version April 2008).  
2  Prviate is not necessarily synonymous with small in our Continental European setting. Many of the business 
groups in our sample are among the largest competitors in their industry on a national or European level 
(average total assets of 135.3 million euros). Even many of the individual group affiliates we consider would 
meet the size requirements for stock exchange quotation on European exchanges as Euronext, Deutsche Börse or 
the London Stock Exchange. 
3 Belgium is a typical example of a civil law country where external capital markets are relatively 
underdeveloped compared to the Anglo Saxon world, and where most firms are financed through internal 
resources and private debt (mostly bank debt). Domestic equity market capitalization at the end of 2007 was 
79.7% of GDP for Belgium, compared to 143.9% for the US and 139.8% for the UK (Sources: World Federation 
of Exchanges, Euronext, Belgostat).  
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Considering that – to the best of our knowledge – this is the first paper in the literature 
to focus on the differences in leverage dynamics between private group affiliates and stand-
alone companies, we start the empirical analysis with extensive summary statistics and 
univariate tests on leverage levels and total, internal and external leverage adjustments. Next, 
we estimate target leverage models for the combined sample of stand-alone and group 
companies and for each sample separately. These estimated targets are used in second stage 
regressions, which are multinomial logistic models of the determinants of a substantial 
leverage increase or decrease. Throughout all types of empirical tests we find significant 
differences between group and stand-alone companies in the levels of leverage, the 
adjustment process and its determinants. The evidence indicates that group affiliates take 
advantage of their better access to financing to more frequently adjust both their total 
leverage and their external leverage ratios.  
 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview 
of the relevant literature on capital structure and capital structure dynamics. The link with the 
literature on business groups and internal capital markets is made in Section 3, which also 
formulates several hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the sample and descriptive statistics and 
Section 5 contains the empirical analysis. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the main 
conclusions. 
 
 
2. Capital Structure Research: an Evolution towards Dynamics 
 
Most capital structure studies start from one or both of the most influential theoretical 
frameworks: the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984) and the trade-
off theory (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). Essentially, trade-off 
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theory argues that leverage has both costs (e.g. increased bankruptcy risk and transaction 
costs) and benefits, e.g. tax deductibility (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980) or reduction of 
agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). Companies will set their 
leverage level such that the marginal benefits of adding more debt will equal the marginal 
costs. This implies companies have a target, or optimal, level of leverage, which should be 
linked to a number of characteristics that reflect the firm’s sensitivity to the different costs 
and benefits of debt. The pecking order theory, on the contrary, does not support the notion of 
an optimal leverage level (Myers, 1984). Instead, it predicts that companies will make a 
decision on what source of financing to use each time a need arises. This choice will be based 
on transaction costs and costs arising from asymmetric information, resulting in a general 
pecking order of retained earnings over different debt classes (ranging from very safe to 
highly risky) to, lastly, equity. Both theories allow to hypothesize links between a number of 
company characteristics (e.g. size, age, profitability, risk, tangibility, etc.) and capital 
structure. Empirical studies (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Fama and 
French, 2002, among many others) tend to be inconclusive on which framework dominates. 
Research into corporate behaviour seems to support trade-off theory: in surveys among CFOs 
of public companies, Graham and Harvey (2001) and Bancel and Mittoo (2004) document 
that 81% of U.S. and 75% of European firms have a target level or target range of leverage. 
Brounen et al. (2006) confirm these results for a mixed sample of public and private 
companies from four European countries. 
 
 Several authors have pointed out that the basic theoretical frameworks, for instance 
trade-off theory, only imply a relationship between the optimal leverage level and certain 
company characteristics, while most empirical papers examine observed leverage levels. If 
there are capital market frictions (e.g. transaction fees), or if companies try to time their 
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financing operations based on market conditions, observed levels of leverage may 
systematically deviate from the optimum (among the first to raise this point were Taggart, 
1977 and Marsh, 1982). Dynamic capital structure models (e.g. Fischer et al., 1989) allow 
reconciling the existence of a long-term optimal level of leverage (consistent with trade-off 
theory) with short-term pecking order behaviour. In other words, companies may allow their 
leverage levels to fluctuate according to pecking order theory until the deviation from the 
long term optimum becomes large enough to warrant a costly leverage adjustment. The 
empirical way of addressing this issue is by decomposing observed leverage into an 
unobserved target level and a deviation from the optimum. Some papers use the historic mean 
of leverage as a proxy for the target level (Javilvand and Harris, 1984; Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers, 1999). A small number of papers model the target level and the speed of adjustment to 
the target simultaneously using non-linear regression techniques (e.g. Heshmati, 2001 for 
Sweden and de Haas and Peeters, 2006 for transition economies), or explore aggregate data 
(Frank and Goyal, 2004).  
 
The most popular method is a two step estimation procedure in which the target or 
optimal leverage level is estimated first and the estimated optimum or the deviation to the 
optimum is used as a variable in a second stage regression. One type of research question that 
can be addressed in the second stage – often using GMM dynamic panel data techniques – is 
whether and how fast companies reduce the gap between their optimal and observed levels of 
leverage (de Miguel and Pindado, 2001; Ozkan, 2001; Gaud et al., 2005; Drobetz and 
Wanzenried, 2006; Flannery and Rangan, 2006). Another approach for the second stage is 
modelling the determinants of a substantial change in capital structure using probit or 
multinomial logistic regressions – the technique used in this paper – (Hovakimian et al., 
2001; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Brav, 2004; Hovakimian et al., 2004) or hazard models  
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(Leary and Roberts, 2005). The intuitive rationale for this approach is that, if companies care 
about the optimality of their capital structure, managers are likely to do a thorough analysis of 
all the trade-offs when they substantially adjust their leverage (Hovakimian et al., 2001). To 
decide whether or not a company has adjusted its capital structure in a significant way, cut-
offs are used (e.g. an increase or decrease in debt or equity of more than 5% of book value of 
assets). Hovakimian et al. (2001) confirm that the classification of companies that have made 
capital structure adjustments according to the cut-off method corresponds quite well to SDC 
issue data for US companies. The cut-off method can easily be applied to our sample of 
private companies as it does not require data on individual debt issuances/retirements or 
equity issuances/repurchases. In fact, Leary and Roberts (2005) argue that cut-offs may be 
preferable over public capital transaction data because they also capture private debt 
transactions. 
 
 
 
3. Capital Structure in Business Groups: Analysis and Hypotheses 
 
Existing evidence from the business group literature shows that the capital structure decision 
process of a business group member company is likely to be different from that of the stand-
alone companies which are studied in the general literature on capital structure. First, it is 
important to note that – contrary to the case of theoretical conglomerate studies, where 
external financing is often assumed to be raised by headquarters and passed through to the 
different divisions (e.g. Gertner et al., 1994; Stein, 1997) – business group subsidiaries are 
separate legal entities, which means that they can directly access the external capital markets. 
In addition, group member companies may also have access to financing via an internal 
capital market which can be used to shift risks and resources throughout the group’s structure 
(cf. Shin and Stultz, 1998; Deloof, 1998). Therefore, capital structure decisions of business 
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group subsidiaries are likely to be the result of a complex group wide trade-off between the 
benefits and costs of different financing sources (equity/internal debt/external debt).  
 
According to several authors the optimal total leverage level of a business group 
affiliated company should be higher than that of a comparable stand-alone firm. Hoshi et al. 
(1990) argue that the costs arising from information asymmetries at debt renegotiations are 
smaller within business groups. These decreased potential costs of financial distress allow 
group members to ex ante take on more debt, thus realizing more tax gains and avoiding 
relatively expensive equity issues. A coinsurance effect across activities in diversified groups 
could further decrease costs of debt (cf. Berger and Ofek, 1995). Furthermore, an intra-group 
optimization process may take place via the internal capital market to reduce costs at all 
levels (cf. Faccio et al., 2001; Bianco and Nicodano, 2006; Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle, 
2009), again increasing ex ante optimal leverage.  Next, the subsidiary may receive intra-
group debt guarantees which could increase its debt bearing capacity even more (Chang and 
Hong, 2000).  Finally, belonging to a business group may also have other non-quantifiable 
beneficial effects: the group’s reputation may change perception and behavior of banks and 
other creditors, thus increasing access to external finance (cf. Schiantarelli and Sembenelli, 
2000). On the other hand, groups are also able to exploit the limited liability of their 
members, i.e. letting lower level subsidiaries file for bankruptcy at the expense of external 
debt providers to save the rest of the group’s activities (Bianco and Nicodano, 2006). These 
types of problems increase the cost of debt, or in other words decrease the optimal level of 
leverage. However, in practice the benefits of allowing group member companies to fail may 
be limited, as the failure of a large subsidiary is likely to have a strong negative impact on 
group reputation. The results of Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2006) indeed indicate that 
Belgian business groups continue to support their troubled operating subsidiaries for as long 
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as they can manage. Direct evidence on the differences in total debt ratio between group 
affiliated and non-group affiliated companies is reported by e.g. Manos et al. (2007) who find 
significantly higher leverage levels for Indian listed group affiliates and Lee et al. (2000) who 
show that Korean chaebol members are more highly levered than non-group companies. 
Therefore, the first testable hypothesis is: 
H1 – Business group companies are more highly levered than stand-alone companies. 
 
A number of the reasons why the level of leverage of business group affiliates could differ 
from that of stand-alones mentioned above may also have implications for leverage 
adjustments. As debt raised via the internal capital markets is owner provided and therefore 
can be renegotiated at very low to zero cost and does not suffer from major asymmetric 
information problems, capital structure adjustment costs may be lower for group member 
companies. The existence of intra-group guarantees and reputation effects which facilitate 
access to external financing (e.g. bank financing) are again likely to lower the costs of 
adjusting leverage. Empirical evidence on this issue is very limited: to the best of our 
knowledge, only one paper takes into account the impact of group-affiliation on capital 
structure adjustment: for a sample of Korean listed manufacturing companies Kim et al. 
(2006) find that both the target level of leverage and the speed of leverage adjustment are 
higher for chaebol members. In our sample, an additional reason why there could be 
differences in capital structure adjustments between group and stand-alone companies is the 
fact that group affiliated companies are less likely to face credit rationing by banks caused by 
asymmetric information (cf. Ghatak and Kali, 2001). Credit rationing could be an important 
reason why private companies do not raise their leverage, even if it is optimal to do so 
(Faulkender and Petersen, 2006). All of the above leads us to the second testable hypothesis: 
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H2 – Business group companies adjust their capital structure more frequently than stand-
alone companies 
 
The total leverage of a typical group-affiliated company consists of two components: 
external and internal leverage. This implies that, compared to stand-alone companies, group 
companies have an additional capital structure choice to make: they have to decide on their 
total level of leverage and on the relative importance of internal and external debt (the 
internal/external debt concentration ratio).  In other words, business group companies may 
also change the internal/external leverage concentration ratio as part of their capital structure 
optimization. For instance, Bianco and Nicodano (2006) show that the use of external debt at 
the subsidiary level in Italian business groups is lower than at the holding level to limit costs 
of potential expropriation of creditors. Similar results are found by Piga (2002). Verschueren 
and Deloof (2006) report that internal debt is (at least partly) used as a substitute for external 
debt in Belgian firms. Desai et al. (2004) show that foreign affiliates of US-based 
multinational corporations use parent-provided debt as a substitute for external debt, 
especially in countries where access to external financing is limited or expensive. 
Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2009) find evidence consistent with a pecking order of internal 
debt over external (bank) debt and the presence of a group-wide optimization of financing 
costs linked to the relative use of both debt sources in Belgian private domestic groups. Given 
this type of behaviour, the question arises if the more frequent leverage adjustments 
hypothesized in H2 are solely caused by the use of highly flexible internal leverage, or if 
group affiliates use their relatively superior access to external financing – facilitated by, for 
instance, parent guarantees or the reputation effects mentioned above – to frequently adjust 
their external leverage ratios as well. Given the lack of evidence on this issue in the literature, 
this remains an empirical question and leads to our third testable hypothesis: 
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H3 – Business group companies adjust their external leverage more frequently than stand-
alone companies. 
 
4. Sample and descriptive statistics  
 
As a starting point, we collect data on all private Belgian non-financial companies that file 
non-consolidated complete financial statements4 for at least six consecutive fiscal years 
during the period 1996 to 2005. The data are obtained from Bureau Van Dijk EP’s BelFirst 
database. Using ownership and financial criteria, we select two samples: one consisting of 
member companies of business groups, the other containing only stand-alone companies. 
 
For the group sample, we select operating subsidiaries of all Belgian non-financial 
private business groups filing group consolidated accounts (excluding State controlled 
groups).5 We state that a company is affiliated to a business group if at least 50% of its shares 
are held (directly or indirectly) by the controlling company of the group.6 Because of the high 
levels of ownership concentration within most Belgian business groups, setting a lower 
threshold (e.g. 20%, cf. Gadhoum et al., 2005) would only have a marginal impact on the 
number of included companies.  
 
                                                 
4 Under Belgian Accounting Law, companies are required to file complete (unconsolidated) accounts if they 
meet at least two of the following criteria: total assets exceed 3.125 million euro, operating revenue exceeds 6.25 
million euro, more than 50 full time equivalent employees. Companies with more than 100 full time equivalent 
employees always have to file complete accounts. All other firms may file abbreviated accounts, which contain 
less information on issues which are relevant to our research questions (e.g. intra-group financing). 
5 Although limiting the analysis to groups with consolidated accounts introduces a potential size bias (companies 
are exempted from filing consolidated accounts if they do not surpass more than one of the following criteria: 
revenues of 20 million EUR, total assets of 10 million EUR, or 250 employees), it ensures that the variables we 
will define at the group level capture economic reality as accurately as possible. As an alternative, Manos et al. 
(2007) or Chang and Hong (2000) compute group level variables as the value weighted average of the individual 
member firms’ variables. Although following this approach would cancel the need for consolidated statements, 
it is likely to lead to information quality problems in our sample of private companies. 
6 According to Belgian Accounting Law, all firms which are controlled by, or are controlling a corporation, are 
considered to be affiliated. The Law defines control as owning more than 50% of the shares or the votes, or 
having common controlling shareholders who can appoint the majority of the board or can make strategic 
decisions. This control can also be the result of company bylaws, contracts or the existence of a consortium.  
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To minimize the risk of misclassifying a group affiliated company as stand-alone, we 
use a double criterion to include a firm in the stand-alone sample (cf. Dewaelheyns and Van 
Hulle, 2009): the company should not have a dominant incorporated shareholder (i.e. the 
largest incorporated shareholder does not control more than 20% of the sample company, 
directly or indirectly) and it should not report the use of intra-group financing.  
 
Following common practice, we exclude companies with zero sales, several categories 
of service companies (e.g. real estate management) and firms with extremely high leverage 
levels (>100% of total assets).7 Using the criteria described above, we end up with a group 
sample of 4,488 firm years of 488 companies (part of 226 different business groups) which – 
due to variable construction and lagging – results in 2,536 testable firm years from fiscal 
years 1999-2005.  For reasons of comparability, we select a one-to-one sample of stand-alone 
companies that matches the industry and the size of the group sample firms as closely as 
possible8, resulting in 2,875 testable firm years. Panel A of Table 1 shows that all major non-
financial industries are represented in the sample, with an emphasis on manufacturing and 
distribution. 
************************ 
Table 1 about here 
************************ 
 
Based on the literature discussed in Section 2, we select a number of control variables 
which will be included in the first stage (i.e. target leverage) and second stage (i.e. 
determinants of leverage adjustments) regression models. For the target leverage models, we 
                                                 
7 Including firm years with extreme levels of leverage could potentially influence the results of the target 
leverage models. However, as the 100% leverage level is only exceeded in 1.4% of all firm years, robustness 
checks show that including these observations would not affect our results. 
8 Using the full stand-alone sample would lead to important differences in size and industry distribution across 
samples. For instance, the total assets of the median group sample company are more than twice as large as those 
of the median firm in the full stand-alone sample. Size matching is done based on total assets. Industry matching 
is based on a 2-digit NACE classification code.  
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include measures of company size, tangibility, growth opportunities and earnings volatility. 
Company size (SIZE, proxied by the logarithm of total assets) is expected to be positively 
related to the optimal level of leverage as larger companies will, ceteris paribus, have lower 
costs of financial distress (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Tangible assets can be used as 
collateral for loans. As collateralization reduces the expected costs of bankruptcy for the 
lender and thus lowers the cost of debt, companies with a higher tangible assets ratio 
(measured as tangible fixed assets to total assets, TANG) should have a higher optimal level 
of leverage. Companies with strong growth opportunities (GROWTH, proxied by the average 
annual sales growth of the last three firm years) may prefer lower leverage levels, due to 
increased asymmetric information problems and the fact that debt servicing could hinder 
growth (McConnell and Servaes, 1995). Earnings volatility (VOLATILITY, defined as the 
standard deviation of net earnings over total assets of the last three firm years) is a measure of 
risk and should therefore be negatively related to the target leverage level. Company level 
control variables which will be included in the second stage regressions are profitability and 
changes in growth opportunities. According to pecking order theory, strong (weak) 
profitability (PROFIT, defined as net earnings over total assets) will cause a company to 
reduce (increase) its level of leverage. Hovakimian et al. (2001) argue that changes in 
leverage are also likely to coincide with changes in growth opportunities (ΔGROWTH, which 
is the 1-yr change of the variable GROWTH). Table 1 Panel B reports the medians (left-hand 
side) and means (right-hand side) of all these non-leverage related characteristics of the 
companies in the stand-alone and group samples, and statistics for equality tests across 
samples. First of all it should be noted that, even after matching for size, the companies in the 
group sample are still statistically significantly larger than those in the stand-alone sample, 
although this difference is unlikely to be important in economic terms (median total assets of 
9.8 million euros for stand-alones vs. 12.1 million euros for group subsidiaries). Several of 
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the other characteristics are significantly different as well: compared to stand-alones, group 
companies have relatively less tangible assets (TANG), a somewhat lower sales growth rate 
(GROWTH) and more volatile profitability ratios (VOLATILITY). The profitability ratios 
themselves (PROFIT) do not significantly differ across the samples, nor does the change in 
growth rates (ΔGROWTH). 
 
 
 
5. Tests and Results 
 
5.1. Leverage and leverage dynamics: univariate tests 
 
The first panel (Panel A) of Table 2 reports means, medians and standard deviations of the 
total leverage ratios for the companies in the stand-alone and group samples. Note that we use 
an overall leverage proxy (LEV, defined as LT + ST liabilities over total assets; cf. Desai et 
al., 2004) while most Anglo-Saxon studies use long-term debt as a measure of leverage. 
However, Titman and Wessels (1988) point out that in countries where short-term liabilities 
are important financing sources, measures of leverage should include these as well. The 
importance of short-term debt in Belgium has been confirmed by e.g. Deloof and Jegers 
(1999). Consistent with expectations (H1) and existing empirical evidence (e.g. Lee et al., 
2000), total leverage is significantly higher for group member companies than for stand-
alones (a difference of 3.5% in means and 3.2% in medians). More interestingly, however, 
Table 2 Panel B shows that the average degree of change in leverage is different across the 
samples as well. The mean absolute 1-yr change in total leverage ratio in the group sample is 
5.39% (median of 3.81%), compared to 4.64% for the stand-alone sample (median of 3.31%). 
This could be a first indication that the leverage of group subsidiaries may be adjusted more 
often (or to a greater extent) than that of comparable stand-alone companies, supportive of 
H2. 
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************************ 
Table 2 about here 
************************ 
 
More explicit evidence of differences in leverage adjustment can be found in Panel C. 
Analogous to, for instance, Hovakimian et al. (2001) and Leary and Roberts (2005) we define 
a firm year with substantial leverage change as a firm year during which the total leverage 
ratio increases or decreases by more than 5% of total assets. Robustness checks9 show that 
although changing the cut-off to e.g. 3% or 7% obviously affects the number of leverage 
increase and decrease firm years, the main results and conclusions of the univariate and 
multivariate tests remain unchanged.  
 
Group affiliated companies have significantly more leverage increases (in 17.6% of 
firm years) and decreases (in 22.7% of firm years) than stand-alones. Put differently, there is 
a substantial change in leverage in 40.3% of firm years in the group sample (i.e. one change 
every 2.5 years on average), compared to 33.5% of firm years in the stand-alone sample (i.e. 
one change every 3.0 years on average). Although direct comparison is difficult because of 
differences in data frequency and variable definitions, the occurrence of leverage adjustments 
in both of our samples appears to be notably lower than for the U.S. quoted companies in 
Leary and Roberts’ (2005) sample which adjust leverage about once a year on average. Given 
the fact that private companies have much more restricted access to equity and external debt 
financing, this is not surprising. For both samples it can also be observed that there are 
significantly10 more leverage decreases than leverage increases. A potential explanation could 
be that our sample period (1999-2005) has seen stable and relatively high corporate profits 
and growth, allowing companies to gradually reduce their leverage. In fact, the average total 
                                                 
9 Available upon request. 
10 Test not reported in Table 2. 
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leverage ratio trends down from 64.5% (1999) to 59.1% (2005) in the group sample, and from 
62.2% (1999) to 56.2% (2005) in the stand-alone sample. A final point of notice is that 
leverage adjustments are not only more frequent in group companies, they are also slightly 
larger (not reported in Table 2 to limit the Table’s size): the average change in the total 
leverage ratio is -9.55% for stand-alones vs. -10.16% for group affiliates in leverage decrease 
years (difference significant at the 5% level) and +9.63% (stand-alones) vs. +10.21% (group 
affiliates) in leverage increase years (difference significant at the 10% level). 
 
In the remainder of this sub-section we focus on the details of the types of leverage 
and leverage dynamics for the group sample reported in Table 3. Panel A of Table 3 contains 
summary statistics on the external leverage ratio (EXTLEV = external liabilities/total assets), 
the internal leverage ratio (INTLEV = internal liabilities/total assets) and the internal leverage 
concentration ratio (INTLEVC = internal liabilities/total liabilities). Consistent with empirical 
evidence of, for instance, Verschueren and Deloof (2006) and Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle 
(2009), we observe that although total leverage of group affiliated companies is higher than 
that of stand-alones, the substantial use of internal leverage (internal leverage ratio of 16.99% 
on average) leads to lower external leverage ratios (mean of 46.09%) compared to stand-
alones for which – by definition – all leverage is external (mean of 59.59%, see Table 2 Panel 
A). Internal leverage is non-zero in 86.7% of all firm years and the internal leverage 
concentration ratio is 29.83% on average (median of 21.93%).  
 
************************ 
Table 3 about here 
************************ 
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Panel B of Table 3 shows absolute one year changes in internal and external leverage 
ratios which are relatively high compared to the changes found for stand-alone companies. In 
fact, even though external leverage is only a part of total leverage, the one year absolute 
changes in the external leverage ratio in group affiliated companies are larger (both in terms 
of means and medians) than the absolute changes in the total leverage ratios in stand-alone 
companies in Table 2 Panel B, which is supportive of hypothesis H3. In absolute terms, the 
changes in internal leverage are smaller than those in external leverage, but in relative terms, 
the changes in internal leverage ratios are more important: the average change in internal 
leverage equals 34.9% of the average internal leverage ratio, while the average change in 
external leverage is 15.4% of the average external leverage ratio. Table 3 Panel C confirms 
that both changes in external and internal leverage are important: in firm years with a 
leverage increase, both the internal leverage ratio and the external leverage ratio increase 
significantly (and vice versa in leverage decrease firm years).11 Interestingly, the relative use 
of internal and external leverage evolves as well: in leverage increase firm years the internal 
leverage concentration ratio rises by 3.6% on average (median of 1.8%), while in leverage 
decrease firm years the relative use of internal leverage declines by 2.7% on average (median 
of 0.7%). This is consistent with evidence from Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2009) who 
show that there is a positive relationship between the level of total leverage and the internal 
leverage concentration. 
 
We take a closer look at the magnitude of changes in external and internal leverage in 
the different types of firm years (increase/decrease/no change in leverage) in Panel D of 
Table 3. Thanks to the presence of internal leverage, in many cases (40.8% of leverage 
increase years and 39.7% of leverage decrease years) the total leverage ratio can be adjusted 
                                                 
11 All the mean and median increases and decreases in Table 3 Panel C are significantly different from zero at 
the 1% level based on t-tests and Wilcoxon tests (not reported). 
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without a substantial change in external leverage. In a limited number of cases, the external 
leverage ratio is even reduced in leverage increase firm years (13.2%) or raised in leverage 
decrease firm years (10.8%). Moreover, in a meaningful number of the firm years without a 
change in total leverage of more than 5%, there is a substantial change in external (30.2% of 
firm years) and/or internal leverage (32.8% of firm years)12, which indicates that the relative 
importance of internal and external leverage is rebalanced without greatly affecting overall 
leverage. 
 
5.2. Target leverage models 
Results of least squares regression estimates of the optimal or target leverage ratios are 
reported in Table 4. As discussed in Section 4, all models contain a number of company 
specific control variables which have often been related to target leverage levels throughout 
the literature: company size (SIZE), tangibility (TANG), growth opportunities (GROWTH) 
and earnings volatility (VOLATILITY).  Models 1 and 2 are estimated using all testable firm 
years (i.e. from both the stand-alone and the group sample). Model 1 is a pooled OLS 
regression with industry and time dummies which includes the four company specific control 
variables and a dummy (GROUP) which distinguishes the group affiliates from the stand-
alone firms. All explanatory variables are lagged one period to avoid simultaneity biases. As 
expected, target leverage is positively related to a company’s size and tangibility and 
negatively related to risk which is proxied by VOLATILITY. GROWTH is significant at the 
10% level with a positive sign, which could be explained by the fact that privately held 
companies sometimes can only resort to debt to finance growth. The GROUP dummy is 
highly significant and positively related to target leverage: after controlling for company 
characteristics and industry effects the target leverage level of group affiliates is about 4% 
                                                 
12 Note that the percentages of firm years for changes in internal leverage do not sum to 100 because of the 
limited number of group affiliates that do not make use of internal leverage and therefore always have a change 
in internal leverage of zero. 
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higher than that of stand-alones (cf. H1). Model 2 includes fixed firm effects to control for all 
firm specific characteristics not captured by the other variables. Given that there is no 
mobility across samples (i.e. companies are either group affiliated or stand-alone and remain 
so during the entire sample period), the GROUP dummy can no longer be included. The 
results for the remaining variables are similar to those in model 1, except for GROWTH 
which is no longer significant.  
************************ 
Table 4 about here 
************************ 
 
Next, we estimate a fixed effects model for the stand-alone and the group member 
sample separately (models 3 and 4 in Table 4 respectively). For both types of companies, the 
target total leverage ratio increases with size and tangibility and decreases with earnings 
volatility. The only difference is that growth opportunities are significantly positively related 
to target leverage for stand-alone companies and are not significant for group members. In the 
final two models in Table 4 (models 5 and 6) the dependent variable is the external leverage 
ratio (EXTLEV) instead of the total leverage ratio (LEV). Model 5 shows that, just as for 
total leverage, the target external leverage ratio is positively related to SIZE and TANG. 
VOLATILITY turns out to be more important in determining target external leverage as 
compared to total leverage. This is consistent with results from Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle 
(2009), who show that external debt is used the least by those subsidiaries for which access to 
this type of debt is expensive, hence the strong negative relationship between earnings 
volatility as a proxy for risk and the target external debt ratio. In model 6 we add the same 
type of variables (size, growth opportunities and earnings volatility13), but now computed at 
                                                 
13 Including tangibility at the group level is unlikely to be relevant: all business group member companies are 
separate legal entities and tangible assets can only be used as collateral by their legal owner (i.e. the individual 
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the consolidated group level (GSIZE, GGROWTH and GVOLATILITY). Of these group 
level variables, only GVOLATILITY is significantly related to the optimal external leverage 
ratio with a positive sign. This is in line with the reasoning of Bianco and Nicodano (2006), 
who argue that groups may raise debt at subsidiary level instead of at group headquarters, to 
be able to exploit the subsidiary’s limited liability in case of financial difficulties: in times of 
distress they could let one or more subsidiaries go bankrupt to save the rest of the group. If 
this is the case, in riskier groups (i.e. groups with higher earnings volatility), the target use of 
external debt of its subsidiaries is higher.  
 
5.3. Determinants of leverage increases and decreases 
We now turn to multinomial logistic regressions which simultaneously model the 
determinants of the probability that a company will substantially increase or decrease its 
leverage (following the definition outlined in Section 5.1) versus the probability of no change 
in leverage. The target leverage ratios (LEV*) estimated in the previous sub-section are used 
to compute the difference between the actual level of leverage and the target for each firm 
year (LEV* – LEV). As mentioned before, other variables which could prove useful in 
explaining leverage increase and decreases in this step of the analysis include net profitability 
(PROFIT) and the change in growth opportunties (ΔGROWTH). In addition, we include 
dummies which indicate whether or not there was an increase or decrease of leverage in the 
previous period (INCREASE and DECREASE). Leary and Roberts (2005) argue that if 
companies do not adjust their capital structure as long as their level of leverage remains 
within certain upper and lower bounds – set according to the trade-off between the benefits of 
adjusting and the costs of doing so – an increase (decrease) in the previous period will 
automatically bring leverage closer to the upper (lower) bound and hence will raise the 
                                                                                                                                                        
group member). Robustness checks confirm that group tangibility is not significant and that including this 
variable does not change the other findings. 
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likelihood of a leverage decrease (increase) in the current period. The first system of 
equations reported in Table 5 is estimated on the combined sample including both stand-alone 
and group affiliated companies and also contains the group membership dummy (GROUP). 
Given the panel structure of our data set, inferences are based on cluster robust standard 
errors (CRSE) which allow for potential within-cluster (i.e. company specific) correlation of 
the error terms.  
 
************************ 
Table 5 about here 
************************ 
 
First of all, the deviation from the target (i.e. the predicted value from Table 4 model 
2) is a very important determinant of both the leverage decrease (equation 1) and the leverage 
increase decision (equation 1’), with the expected signs. For instance, if LEV* – LEV in the 
previous period is positive the company’s leverage is below its target level, which reduces the 
probability of a leverage decrease and raises the probability of an increase in leverage in the 
current period. This result is consistent with the trade-off theory of leverage, but there is also 
evidence supporting pecking order: strong net profitability (PROFIT) increases the chance of 
a leverage decrease decision and lowers the likelihood that the company will raise the level of 
leverage. The change in growth opportunities (ΔGROWTH) is not significant. Overall, these 
results are in line with those of e.g. Hovakimian et al. (2004) who also document elements of 
both trade-off and pecking order behavior. More important from the point of view of this 
paper’s research questions however, is that the GROUP dummy is significantly related to 
both leverage increase and decrease probabilities. This confirms the univariate results from 
Section 5.1: ceteris paribus, group member companies are more likely to adjust their leverage 
than comparable stand-alone firms (H2). A final point of interest is that, contrary to Leary and 
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Roberts’ (2005) findings for U.S. quoted companies a leverage increase (decrease) in the 
previous period does not lead to a better chance of a decrease (increase) in leverage in the 
next period. On the contrary, a change in leverage is more likely to be followed by another 
adjustment in the same direction. This could indicate that, given the fact that the privately 
held companies in our sample have more limited access to financing than quoted firms, they 
may need to adjust their capital structures gradually through time in order to make major 
changes. 
 
The second system of equations in Table 5 is estimated for the stand-alone sample 
only. If we compare equations 2 and 2’ in Table 5 to equations 1 and 1’ in Table 6 (which are 
estimated using only the companies in the group sample) we see that most results are 
analogous.14 For both stand-alone and group companies, being below (above) the leverage 
target significantly raises the probability of a leverage increase (decrease) and leverage 
increases (decreases) are more likely to be followed by another leverage increase (decrease). 
However, the results w.r.t. PROFIT are different: for stand-alone companies strong 
profitability makes a leverage decrease more likely (PROFIT is significant at the 1% with a 
positive sign in equation 2 in Table 5), while it is not significant for the group sample 
(equation 1 in Table 6). Strong profitability reduces the likelihood of an increase in leverage 
for both stand-alone and group member companies, although the effect appears to be 
somewhat stronger for stand-alones. The evidence supporting pecking order theory is 
therefore weaker for group companies: due to the availability of funding via the internal 
capital markets, group members’ leverage decisions are not necessarily related to a 
company’s short term profitability. 
                                                 
14 Note that there are two levels of potential error clustering in the group sample: within company-specific 
clusters and within group-specific clusters. Given there is no transference of ownership of sample companies 
across groups in our sample, the two levels of clustering are nested, and the highest level of clustering (i.e. the 
group level) should be used to compute the CRSE (cf. Cameron et al., 2006). 
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************************ 
Table 6 about here 
************************ 
  
The next system of equations reported in Table 6 (2 and 2’) models whether or not the 
external leverage ratio (EXTLEV) of a group member company changes. Comparing the 
results with those of equations 1 and 1’ for the total leverage ratio, the main difference is the 
fact that an increase in external leverage (EXTINCREASE) during the previous fiscal year 
significantly raises the probability of a external leverage decrease and a decrease 
(EXTDECREASE) during the previous year raises the likelihood of an increase in external 
leverage (significant at the 10% level). This pattern of external leverage increases followed 
by decreases could indicate that some group member companies have less restricted access to 
external financing than stand-alone companies allowing them to engage in dynamic trade-off 
behavior closer to that observed in public companies (cf. hypothesis H3). However, an 
external leverage increase or decrease is still highly significantly related to the probability of 
a change in the same direction during the next period, which implies that even affiliates of 
private business groups often use a stepwise process in making major capital structure 
adjustments. As a final extension to the analysis, the third system of equations in Table 6 
examines whether or not external leverage changes are related to the financial health of the 
group (measured by an Altman Z”-score, see Altman, 1993). We define a dummy variable 
(BADGROUP) which has a value of 1 if the company is an affiliate of a group in the bottom 
decile of group health within our sample. We interact the BADGROUP dummy with the 
deviation from the target variable and find that this interaction term has the opposite sign of 
the main effect for both the increase and decrease equations: i.e. for a given deviation from 
the target external leverage ratio, a subsidiary of a group in relatively bad financial health is 
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less likely to adjust its capital structure. In other words, consistent with the literature on group 
financing, affiliates of healthy business groups are more flexible in their financing decisions. 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
We find significant differences in the use of leverage, the leverage adjustment process and the 
determinants of the target leverage level and leverage increases/decreases between samples of 
non-financial affiliates of Belgian private business groups and stand-alone companies. We 
show that group affiliates not only have higher levels of leverage, but that they also adjust 
their capital structure more frequently and to a larger extent than stand-alones. In addition, the 
existence of internal capital markets within the group provides group affiliates with the 
opportunity to optimize their internal/external leverage concentration, which adds to their 
flexibility. For instance, changing the internal/external leverage mix allows companies to 
substantially adjust their overall level of leverage without changing their external leverage 
ratio, or vice versa. It is shown that group affiliates have significantly higher target levels of 
leverage than stand-alones and that the optimal leverage level of an affiliate is driven by both 
company level and group level characteristics. For instance, we find that an affiliate’s target 
external leverage ratio is negatively related to its own earnings volatility, but positively 
related to the earnings volatility of the group, indicating that groups attract external leverage 
where it is the least costly (cf. Bianco and Nicodano, 2006; Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle, 
2009).  
 
Using multinomial logistic regressions we show that – controlling for company, time 
and industry effects – group companies are significantly more likely to substantially increase 
or decrease their leverage than stand-alones. For both types of companies a strong 
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relationship is found between the distance to the optimal leverage level and the probability of 
a leverage adjustment, which is consistent with trade-off theory. The evidence for short term 
pecking order behaviour (adjusting leverage according to net earnings) is stronger for stand-
alone companies than for group affiliates. Finally, our evidence suggests that the flexibility in 
group companies’ capital structure is not solely driven by the use of internal leverage: the 
external leverage dynamics of private group companies are closer to those of public 
companies than the adjustment process in private stand-alone companies, which appears to be 
rather rigid due to a more limited access to financing. This relatively high financing flexibility 
compared to stand-alone competitors may be one of the reasons why private business groups 
continue to flourish in many parts of the world without apparently feeling the need to become 
publicly quoted. In this respect, an interesting topic for further research could be comparing 
the leverage adjustment process in the subsidiaries of quoted companies and those of private 
business groups. 
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Table 1 – Sample Properties 
 
Panel A – Industry composition  
 
Panel B – Company Characteristics 
 
Notes: SIZE is defined as ln(total assets); TANG is defined as tangible fixed assets over total assets; GROWTH is defined as the 
average annual sales growth of the last three firm years (in %);  VOLATILITY is defined as the standard deviation of net earnings over 
total assets of the last three firm years (in %); PROFIT is defined as net earnings over total assets; ΔGROWTH is defined as the change 
in annual sales growth; Equality tests across group and stand-alone samples: t-statistics for t-tests (equality of means) and Wilcoxon 
Mann-Whitney tests (equality of medians); *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes 
significance at the 10% level 
Industry 
Number of firms in group 
and stand-alone samples 
% 
Food 67 13.7 
Manufacturing 186 38.1 
Construction 54 11.1 
Trade (Wholesale & Retail) 118 24.2 
Transportation 51 10.5 
Other 12 2.5 
 488  
Variable Median Mean 
 Stand-Alone 
Sample 
Group 
Sample 
Equality 
Test 
Stand-Alone 
Sample 
Group 
Sample 
Equality 
Test
SIZE 9.1926 9.3992     8.147***  9.2288 9.5453 12.224*** 
TANG 0.4312 0.3423   11.706*** 0.4302 0.3598 11.606*** 
GROWTH 0.0374 0.0299     1.939** 0.0417 0.0408 0.196 
VOLATILITY 0.0169 0.0241   11.214*** 0.0264 0.0354 9.273*** 
PROFIT 0.0227 0.0218      1.349 0.0320 0.0294 1.438 
ΔGROWTH -0.0041 -0.0011 0.788 0.0095 0.0036 0.553 
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Table 2 – Leverage and Leverage Adjustments 
 
Panel A – Leverage Ratios 
 
 Mean Median StDev 
Total leverage ratio (LEV) – stand-alone sample 0.5959 0.6311 0.2291 
Total leverage ratio (LEV) – group sample 0.6308 0.6629 0.2101 
Equality test 5.813*** 5.044*** 34.086*** 
 
Panel B – Changes in Leverage Ratios 
 
 Mean Median StDev 
Absolute 1-yr change in LEV  – stand-alone sample 0.0464 0.0331 0.0441 
Absolute 1-yr change in LEV – group sample 0.0539 0.0381 0.0502 
Equality test 5.789*** 4.799*** 32.192*** 
 
Panel C – Firm years with Leverage Adjustments 
 
 
Lev. Increase 
Firm years 
Lev. Decrease 
Firm years 
No Change 
Firm years 
Stand-alone sample 397 
(13.8%) 
565 
(19.7%) 
1,913 
(66.5%) 
Group sample 446 
(17.6%) 
575 
(22.7%) 
1,515 
(59.7%) 
Equality test 3.824*** 2.719*** 5.179*** 
 
Notes: Total leverage ratio (LEV) is defined as long term liabilities plus short term liabilities over total assets; A firmyear is classified as 
Leverage Increase (Decrease) if the total leverage ratio increases (decreases) by 0.05 or more; Equality tests across group and stand-alone 
samples: t-statistics for t-tests (equality of means), Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests (equality of medians), Brown-Forsythe tests (equality 
of variances); *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level 
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Table 3 – Internal versus external leverage and leverage adjustments 
 
Panel A – Internal and External Leverage Ratios 
 
 Mean Median StDev 
External leverage ratio (EXTLEV) 0.4609 0.4542 0.2301 
Internal leverage ratio (INTLEV) 0.1699 0.0839 0.2026 
Internal leverage concentration (INTLEVC) 0.2983 0.2193 0.2690 
 
Panel B – Changes in Internal and External Leverage Ratios 
 
 Mean Median 
Absolute 1-yr change in EXTLEV 0.0712 0.0459 
Absolute 1-yr change in INTLEV 0.0593 0.0283 
Absolute 1-yr change in INTLEVC 0.0847 0.0433 
 
Panel C – Leverage Adjustments and Changes in Internal and External Leverage 
 
 
Lev. Increase 
Firm years 
Lev. Decrease  
Firm years 
1-yr change in LEV (mean) 0.1021 -0.1016 
1-yr change in LEV (median) 0.0879 -0.0882 
   
1-yr change in EXTLEV (mean) 0.0568 -0.0576 
1-yr change in EXTLEV (median) 0.0668 -0.0668 
   
1-yr change in INTLEV (mean) 0.0454 -0.0440 
1-yr change in INTLEV (median) 0.0091 -0.0153 
   
1-yr change in INTLEVC (mean) 0.0361 -0.0271 
1-yr change in INTLEVC (median) 0.0183 -0.0072 
 
Panel D – Leverage Adjustments and Changes in Internal and External Leverage 
 
 
Decrease  
> 0.05 
Decrease 
≤ 0.05 
Increase  
≤ 0.05 
Increase 
> 0.05 
Leverage increase firm years     
Change in EXTLEV 59 (13.2%) 
61 
(13.7%) 
62 
(13.9%) 
264 
(59.2%) 
Change in INTLEV 46 (10.3%) 
102 
(22.9%) 
80 
(17.9%) 
164 
(36.7%) 
     
Leverage decrease firm years     
Change in EXTLEV 347 (60.3%) 
99 
(17.2%) 
67 
(11.7%) 
62 
(10.8%) 
Change in INTLEV 202 (35.1%) 
149 
(25.9%) 
120 
(20.9%) 
48 
(8.3%) 
     
No change firm years     
Change in EXTLEV 275 (18.2%) 
589 
(38.9%) 
469 
(30.9%) 
182 
(12.0%) 
Change in INTLEV 168 (11.1%) 
438 
(28.9%) 
463 
(30.6%) 
272 
(18.0%) 
 
Notes: Total leverage ratio (LEV) is defined as long term liabilities plus short term liabilities over total assets; External leverage ratio 
(EXTLEV)  is defined as external liabilities over total assets; Internal leverage ratio (INTLEV)  is defined as internal liabilities over 
total assets; Internal leverage concentration (INTLEVC) is defined as internal liabilities over total liabilities; A firm year is classified as 
Leverage Increase (Decrease) if the total leverage ratio increases (decreases) by 0.05 or more. 
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Table 4 – Target Leverage Models 
 
 
Combined Sample  
(Stand-alone + Group) 
Stand-alone 
Sample 
Group Sample 
   Total Lev                  External Lev         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SIZEt-1 0.0151*** 
(0.003) 
0.0759*** 
(0.006) 
0.0547*** 
(0.012) 
0.0884*** 
(0.008) 
0.0165** 
(0.007) 
0.0166** 
(0.007) 
TANGt-1  0.1241*** 
(0.009) 
0.0831*** 
(0.016) 
0.1016*** 
(0.009) 
0.0748** 
(0.027) 
0.0466*** 
(0.013) 
0.0458*** 
(0.014) 
GROWTHt-1 0.0272* 
(0.015) 
0.0030 
(0.005) 
0.0236* 
(0.013) 
0.0009 
(0.004) 
-0.0008 
(0.003) 
-0.0008 
(0.003) 
VOLATILITYt-1 -0.4106*** 
(0.042) 
-0.1731** 
(0.071) 
-0.1682** 
(0.085) 
-0.1723* 
(0.095) 
-0.2457*** 
(0.052) 
-0.2674***
(0.046) 
GROUP 0.0400*** 
(0.004) – – – – – 
GSIZEt-1 – – – – – -0.008 (0.007) 
GGROWTHt-1 – – – – – -0.002 (0.007) 
GVOLATILITYt-1 – – – – – 0.063*** (0.023) 
Intercept 0.3918*** 
(0.041) 
-0.1260** 
(0.056) 
0.0527 
(0.105) 
-0.2327*** 
(0.086) 
0.2949*** 
(0.067) 
0.3824*** 
(0.124) 
       
Industry Dummies Yes – – – – – 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed firm effects – Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Firm years 5,410 5,410 2,875 2,535 2,535 2,535 
Adjusted R² 0.0941 0.8704 0.8934 0.8376 0.8076 0.8078 
 
Notes: Dependent variable in models (1) to (4): total leverage ratio (LEV), defined as long term liabilities plus short term liabilities 
over total assets; Dependent variable in models (5) and (6): external leverage ratio (EXTLEV), defined as external liabilities over total 
assets; SIZE is defined as ln(total assets); TANG is defined as tangible fixed assets over total assets; GROWTH is defined as the 
average annual sales growth over the last three firm years (in %);  VOLATILITY is defined as the standard deviation of net profits of 
the last three firm years (in %); GROUP is a dummy variable with value = 1 if a company is part of business group, 0 otherwise; 
GSIZE is defined as ln(total assets of the group); GGROWTH is defined as the average annual sales growth over the last three firm 
years (in %) of the group;  GVOLATILITY is defined as the standard deviation of net profits of the last three firm years (in %) of the 
group; All explanatory variables are lagged by one year; Model (1): pooled OLS with fixed time effects and industry dummies based 
on 2-digit NACE codes, Models (2) to (7): Fixed effects panel least squares regression models; White standard errors in parentheses; 
*** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level 
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Table 5 – Determinants of Leverage Increase/Decrease:  
Combined Sample and Stand-alone Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Multinomial logistic regression models; Dependent variable: categorical variable with value = 1 for leverage 
decrease (total leverage ratio decreases by 0.05 or more), value = 2 for leverage increase (total leverage ratio 
increases by 0.05 or more), value = 0 for no change (base case); LEV* - LEV is defined as the target total leverage 
ratio (LEV*; obtained from Table 3 model (2) for the full sample and Table 3 model (3) for the stand-alone sample) 
minus the actual total leverage ratio (LEV); PROFIT is defined as net earnings over total assets; ΔGROWTH is 
defined as the change in sales growth; 1-yr sales growth (in %); GROUP is a dummy variable with value = 1 if a 
company is part of business group, 0 otherwise; INCREASE is a dummy variable with value = 1 if the company 
increased its total leverage ratio by 0.05 or more in the previous firmyear; DECREASE is a dummy variable with 
value = 1 if the company decreased its total leverage ratio by 0.05 or more in the previous firmyear; All explanatory 
variables are lagged by one year; Clustered robust standard errors (company specific clustering) in parentheses; *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level 
 
Combined Sample 
(Stand-alone + Group) 
Stand-alone Sample 
 
Leverage 
Decrease 
Leverage 
Increase 
Leverage 
Decrease 
Leverage 
Increase 
 (1) (1’) (2) (2’) 
LEV*t-1 – LEVt-1 -14.5865*** 
(1.208) 
16.7166*** 
(1.306) 
-14.9369*** 
(1.362) 
16.8353*** 
(1.860) 
PROFITt-1 3.0139*** 
(0.713) 
-2.9469*** 
(0.927) 
4.9327*** 
(1.072) 
-3.7513** 
(1.543) 
ΔGROWTHt-1 -0.1190 
(0.239) 
-0.0972 
(0.324) 
-0.2065 
(0.320) 
-0.1664 
(0.501) 
GROUP 0.1909** 
(0.076) 
0.3598*** 
(0.089) – – 
INCREASEt-1 -0.0233 
(0.122) 
1.0530*** 
(0.152) 
-0.1149 
(0.169) 
0.9235*** 
(0.205) 
DECREASEt-1 0.9383*** 
(0.109) 
-0.0242 
(0.137) 
0.9347*** 
(0.152) 
-0.0319 
(0.203) 
Intercept -1.7513*** 
(0.117) 
-1.9358*** 
(0.152) 
-1.7528*** 
(0.151) 
-1.9507*** 
(0.191) 
     
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Model χ² Test 420.22*** 252.95*** 
McFadden R² 0.1406 0.1366 
     
Firm years 4,293 2,350 
Dep = 0 (no change) 2,728 1,569 
Dep = 1 (decrease) 931 479 
Dep = 2 (increase) 634 302 
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Table 6 – Determinants of Leverage Increase/Decrease: Group Sample 
Notes: Multinomial logistic regression models; Dependent variable in system of equations (1): categorical variable with value = 1 for total leverage 
decrease (LEV decreases by 0.05 or more), value = 2 for total leverage increase (LEV increases by 0.05 or more), value = 0 for no change (base case); 
Dependent variable for systems of equations (2) and (3): categorical variable with value = 1 for external leverage decrease (EXTLEV decreases by 
0.05 or more), value = 2 for external leverage increase (EXTLEV increases by 0.05 or more), value = 0 for no change (base case); LEV* - LEV is 
defined as the target total leverage ratio (LEV*; obtained from Table 3 model (4)) minus the actual total leverage ratio (LEV); EXTLEV* - EXTLEV 
is defined as the target external leverage ratio (obtained from Table 3 model (6)) minus the actual external leverage ratio; PROFIT is defined as net 
earnings over total assets; ΔGROWTH is defined as the change in 1-yr sales growth (in %); INCREASE is a dummy variable with value = 1 if the 
company increased LEV by 0.05 or more in the previous firmyear; DECREASE is a dummy variable with value = 1 if the company decreased LEV 
by 0.05 or more in the previous firmyear; EXTINCREASE is a dummy variable with value = 1 if the company increased EXTLEV by 0.05 or more in 
the previous firmyear; EXTDECREASE is a dummy variable with value = 1 if the company decreased EXTLEV by 0.05 or more in the previous 
firmyear; BADGROUP is a dummy variable with value = 1 if the company is part of a business group in the bottom decile of financial health (in the 
previous firmyear) according to an Altman Z”-score measure; Clustered robust standard errors (group specific clustering) in parentheses; *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leverage 
Decrease 
Leverage 
Increase 
Ext. Lev 
Decrease 
Ext. Lev 
Increase 
Ext. Lev 
Decrease 
Ext. Lev 
Increase 
 (1) (1’) (2) (2’) (3) (3’) 
LEV*t-1 – LEVt-1 -14.2462*** 
(1.995) 
16.5925*** 
(2.013) – – – – 
EXTLEV*t-1 – EXTLEVt-1 – – -13.8396*** (1.479) 
12.9050*** 
(1.566) 
-14.3334*** 
(1.580) 
13.3827*** 
(1.675) 
(EXTLEV*t-1 – EXTLEVt-1) 
× BADGROUP – – – – 
3.9159* 
(2.368) 
-4.8540* 
(2.854) 
PROFITt-1 1.5668 
(1.021) 
-2.5961** 
(1.170) 
-0.3618 
(0.923) 
-2.5970** 
(1.116) 
-0.4470 
(0.931) 
-2.5844** 
(1.120) 
ΔGROWTHt-1 -0.2017 
(0.389) 
0.0556 
(0.404) 
0.2178 
(0.406) 
-0.4715 
(0.435) 
0.2215 
(0.404) 
-0.4818 
(0.433) 
INCREASEt-1 0.0652 (0.186) 
1.1504*** 
(0.223) – – – – 
DECREASEt-1 0.9269*** (0.152) 
0.0069 
(0.188) – – – – 
EXTINCREASEt-1 – – 0.2791* (0.162) 
0.7391*** 
(0.201) 
0.2748* 
(0.163) 
0.7403*** 
(0.202) 
EXTDECREASEt-1 – – 0.8596*** (0.135) 
0.3157* 
(0.168) 
0.8605*** 
(0.135) 
0.3160* 
(0.169) 
Intercept -1.5793*** 
(0.176) 
-1.5582*** 
(0.235) 
-1.3407*** 
(0.157) 
-1.3421*** 
(0.197) 
-1.3402*** 
(0.158) 
-1.3537*** 
(0.198) 
       
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Wald Model χ² Test 256.91*** 302.19*** 312.48*** 
McFadden  R² 0.1431 0.1665 0.1679 
    
Firm years 1,943 1,943 1,943 
Dep = 0 (no change) 1,159 1,044 1,044 
Dep = 1 (decrease) 452 520 520 
Dep = 2 (increase) 332 379 379 
